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ABSTRACT
SEAN THOMAS NORTON: Local Opposition, Local Issues? Exploring the Dynamics
of Urban Competition in Authoritarian Regimes
(Under the direction of Graeme Robertson.)
A growing literature on post-communist states suggests that urban electoral and con-
tentious dynamics are key for understanding regime trajectories and ruling party strength.
However, our understanding of what drives patterns of political competition and con-
tention at the municipal level remains thin. This lack of knowledge is problematic; while
we may know that urban politics often precede important national-level contentious out-
bursts or electoral shifts, we remain in the dark as to how actors initially gain support
in urban areas. This paper exploits data on Moscow’s most recent municipal council
elections and a large, highly-salient housing program to examine the determinants of
political support at Russia’s lowest level of governance. Using geodata on the housing
project at the polling station level, I expect that polling stations surrounded by a higher
number of included buildings recorded higher levels of opposition vote, controlling for
past opposition support.
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INTRODUCTION
A growing body of research suggests that authoritarian durability relies heavily on
cooperation and control at lower levels of government. Local governments play criti-
cal roles in coopting citizens, targeting the opposition, turning out and coercing voters,
and distributing patronage to regime elites (Magaloni 2006; Reuter and Robertson 2014;
Landry 2008). For these reasons, establishing and maintaining the loyalty of effective
political machines is a critical part of authoritarian consolidation (Saikkonen 2016b,a;
Reuter, Buckley, Shubenkova and Garifullina 2016).
In particular, urban contentious and electoral dynamics play a critical role in au-
thoritarian survival. Increasingly, the professional, urban middle class drives protest and
electoral opposition in authoritarian regimes. Opposition gains in local elections disrupt
patronage networks, establish programmatic ties to voters, and create effective political
bases for opposition to compete against authoritarian incumbents nationally (Lucardi
2016; Magaloni 2006). Urban contention forces incumbents to acknowledge electoral de-
feat, challenges electoral fraud, ties opposition actors to citizens, and creates effective
mobilizing structures. In the more dramatic cases, urban mobilization even bring down
the regime itself (Bunce and Wolchik 2011). In cases as diverse as Tunisia and Serbia, lo-
cal protest, subnational electoral defeats, or both preceded the fall of seemingly powerful
authoritarian regimes (Bunce and Wolchik 2011; Beissinger, Jamal and Mazur 2015).
However, while it is evident that urban political dynamics are important for author-
itarian survival, little is known about political patterns at this level of governance. The
overwhelming consensus in the literature on these issues is silence; local issues and elec-
tions are largely considered to be unimportant and uncontested (Gandhi and Lust-Okar
2009). This lack of knowledge is problematic; if we are to understand how urban politics
affect authoritarian trajectories, we cannot remain in the dark as to how authoritarian in-
cumbents and opposition actors get urban citizens both to the polls and onto the streets.
In particular, the important role played by actors at the subnational level suggests a level
of analysis problem in the authoritarian literature. While a substantial body of work
focuses on the relationship between national-level political and economic factors and au-
thoritarian durability, urban dynamics may also be critical for authoritarian survival.
Using data from Moscow, I argue that local-level political ties are essential to explaining
patterns of political support in authoritarian regimes.
Understanding whether and how local issues drive subnational electoral and con-
tentious shocks will enhance our understanding of authoritarian regimes in three ways.
First, understanding how urban contentious and electoral shocks occur will aid in un-
derstanding the durability of authoritarian regimes. Secondly, as authoritarian regimes
increasingly use elections as an instrument of cooptation and control, the sheer number
of local elections makes them by far the most common electoral events in authoritarian
regimes. As such, a better understanding of local electoral dynamics will give us a more
nuanced, comprehensive picture of authoritarian politics. Most importantly, understand-
ing how opposition actors establish political footholds in authoritarian regimes brings
us closer to a theory that not only explains how opposition actors defeat authoritarian
regimes at the national level, but also how these actors establish their initial ties to citi-
zens and build the mobilizing structures necessary for national contentious and electoral
mobilization. Rather than assuming some sort of opposition capable of coherent mo-
bilization does or does not exist at the national level, exploration in this vein has the
potential to elaborate on when, how, and if opposition actors may create and build on
local success to challenge national authoritarian incumbents.
I begin by arguing that while the literature on authoritarianism has established that
controlling subnational threats is critical to authoritarian regime survival, it treats urban
politics as a black box, obscuring how opposition actors gain the political and organi-
zational footholds necessary to seriously challenge authoritarian incumbents. Following
this, I present my theory that local issues may be crucial for opposition actors ability to
effectively establish these footholds. I will then discuss the appropriateness of my case
selection, identification strategy, and hypothesis. I will close with presentation of results
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and a discussion of their implications for future research.
The Localization of Politics and Case Selection
Subnational Authoritarian Politics
While a robust literature exists on the role of subnational politics in maintaining
authoritarian rule, it largely treats dynamics at the subnational level as a “black box”,
investigating how political dynamics treated as given effect authoritarian survival. In
particular, cross-national statistical studies have established that large cities significantly
reduce the duration of authoritarian regimes, but treat this effect as almost a natural law,
ignoring the role of agency (Wallace 2013). Little consideration is given to how and when
actors in cities are dangerous to authoritarian regimes. Given that even weak regimes
rarely fall without some opposition actor providing the push, ignoring how urban agents
actually accomplish regime-threatening mobilization is problematic (Bunce and Wolchik
2011).
In the urban threat literature, cities, particularly the large capital cities that are char-
acteristic to authoritarian regimes, are tinderboxes of potential collective action (Wallace
2013). As cities get larger, discontent becomes more dangerous; densely-populated, large
cities lower the barriers to collective action, and have the potential to make contention
more destabilizing and threatening to state actors. In addition, large protests in cities
have more potential to create a national “tipping point” phenomenon in which citizens’
public alignments rapidly and dramatically change in response to perceived decrease in
the costs of public opposition (Kuran 1991). As Wallace (2013) details, having a capital
city of over 5 million residents is robustly associated with increased hazard of regime
failure. Facing this potential threat, authoritarian regimes often choose to redistribute
from countryside to cities in an attempt to forestall the short-term threat of collective
action, ultimately increasing urban concentration and the threat of longer-run regime
failure (Wallace 2013; Ades and Glaeser 1995; Bates 2014).
While this literature is generally assumed to apply to contentious politics, it also ra-
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tionally applies to electoral threats in electoral authoritarian regimes. Bunce and Wolchik
(2011) study of electoral authoritarianism in post-communist countries note that in all
but one of their cases of authoritarian incumbent defeat, opposition victories in local elec-
tions preceded the critical national elections. The paradigmatic case is Serbia, in which
the government’s initial refusal to certify the opposition’s victories in Belgrade created a
large contentious surge. The organizational infrastructure of these protests later proved
critical in defeating Milosˇevic´ at the national level (Bunce and Wolchik 2011; Levitsky
and Way 2010). Large cities can be expected to lower the cost of electoral campaigns
in much the same way as they reduce the difficulty of solving the contentious collective
action problem.
In the literature on authoritarian control, subnational governments play a critical role
in patronage, electoral mobilization, and cooptation. PRI rule in Mexico demonstrated
the importance of local control for the maintenance of authoritarian regimes. Hierarchical
distribution of local positions was a crucial part of the PRI’s elite cooptation strategy,
which prevented splits within the PRI regime. Likewise, the “punishment regime” used
to manufacture overwhelming PRI victories and prevent challengers depended on local
brokers who were able to observe voters (Magaloni 2006; Svolik 2012). Evidence from
Russia demonstrates a similar phenomenon. The first Putin presidency’s political in-
novation was to tie once independent local political machines to a single regime party,
United Russia, imbuing the Putin presidency with far greater autonomy than the Yeltsin
regime (Demchenko and Golosov 2016; Saikkonen 2016a; Reuter 2017). As an important
demonstration of the role of local political actors in delivering support, Reuter et al.
(2016) provide evidence that mayoral elections were only retained where mayors were
able to deliver pro-regime votes at the national level. Those who could not deliver were
replaced with more easily-controlled city managers.
In addition to the importance of local control to authoritarian consolidation, failure
to contain local threats has played a significant role in the collapse of many authoritarian
regimes. Lucardi (2016) argues that opposition victories in local elections in Mexico ham-
pered the operation of PRI patronage and electoral machines, lowered the perceived cost
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of defection from the PRI, and created programmatic ties to voters that could be later
mobilized at the national level. Much as in Mexico, local electoral victories in Romania,
Serbia, Georgia, Croatia, and Slovakia directly contributed to the collapse of national
authoritarian regimes. Victory in local elections allowed opposition actors to coordinate,
form cohesive fronts, and create mobilizing organizational structures in an otherwise hos-
tile electoral environment (Bunce and Wolchik 2011; Levitsky and Way 2010). It is clear
that failure to maintain local control, particularly in large cities, presents a real danger to
the survival of authoritarian rule, disrupting authoritarian control and giving opposition
actors critical electoral and physical resources.
While we know that local dynamics, particularly urban dynamics, play an important
role in authoritarian regime trajectories, little is know about how regime and opposition
actors gain and maintain support at these levels. Existing studies of subnational regime
elites generally focus on appointed elites at the regional level (e.g. Reuter and Robert-
son (2012)), obscuring potentially important lower-level dynamics. On the other hand,
existing studies of opposition actors focus almost entirely on national level campaigns,
similarly obscuring dynamics at lower levels (e.g. Bunce and Wolchik (2011)) Given the
consistent role of local electoral success in opposition defeat of national authoritarian in-
cumbents, the lack of research on the dynamics of local political contestation represents a
consequential hole in the literature. It is clear that oppositions often defeat dictators after
gaining local footholds, we do not know how they gain or fail to gain those footholds
in the first place. Specifically, the importance of local elections raises the question of
whether local issues may play a more important role in authoritarian regimes than pre-
viously assumed (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009).
Theory: Boundary Control and Local Issues
The literature on subnational authoritarian enclaves, particularly Gibson 's (2005)
theory of boundary control, leads us to expect that local issues may be critically im-
portant to opposition actors attempting to gain a foothold at the subnational level in
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nationally authoritarian regimes. Gibson argues that subnational authoritarian units
(SAUs) in nationally democratic regimes survive when they practice “boundary control”,
effectively keeping local conflict out of the national spotlight to avoid inconveniencing
or antagonizing the democratic national governments that tolerate their existence. In
this environment, oppositions are incentivized to attempt to break containment, linking
subnational political issues to national movements or thrusting the SAUs’ authoritarian
practices into the national political discourse. This may force the center to acknowledge
and work against the continued practice of authoritarianism at the subnational level. In
short, local opposition attempts to use the juxtaposition of local authoritarianism and
national democracy to its advantage via nationalization of political contestation, forcing
national-level actors to intervene and create a democratic opening.
While Gibson argues that the opposition in authoritarian enclaves has a strong in-
centive to nationalize conflict, I build on his theory to argue that for SAUs in nationally
authoritarian regimes the opposite should be true. Subnational oppositions will attempt
to localize political contestation to ensure their own survival, giving local issues criti-
cal importance. This follows foremost from the fact that national authoritarian regimes
should be expected to control more substantial coercive resources than subnational au-
thoritarian regimes. While this assumption is certainly not universally true, it can be
expected to hold for almost all SAUs in relatively strong, centralized authoritarian states.
Oppositions who attempt to nationalize conflict or tie themselves too heavily to issues
that stretch beyond local political space risk bringing the authoritarian center into the
subnational arena, lessening their chances for electoral victory or even political survival,
and preventing them from establishing a subnational foothold.
While in theory any subnational opposition carries the potential to “go national” if
they capture subnational office, seemingly making any subnational opposition a threat,
a different set of incentives decreases the probability of the center reacting to localized
subnational opposition: limited national resources and subnational leaders’ dependence
on the center for power. National authoritarian regimes will logically be more concerned
with national-level challengers, preferring to let subnational political machines expend
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their own resources on lower-level threats, or even creating incentives designed to make
them do so (Reuter and Robertson 2012). Likewise, SAUs’ leaders may deliver the criti-
cal good of subnational control to the center, but except in highly unstable authoritarian
regimes generally rely on the goodwill of the more powerful center for their continued
existence (Reuter 2017). Given this dependence, SAUs’ leaders are disincentivized from
turning to the center for help in containing electorally dangerous local challengers; if
local political leaders appear ineffective at generating votes and dealing with electoral
threats, their perceived usefulness to the center diminishes. While there is certainly the
possibility that local leaders could exploit local opposition to win more resources from the
center, in strong authoritarian regimes and when SAUs are not ruled in a personalistic
manner, the operation of the local machine is likely possible without the current leader,
i.e. leaders who are too noisy or needy are liable to be replaced. In effect, subnational
authoritarian leaders’ jobs depend in part on their ability to exercise “reverse” boundary
control: keeping oppositions contained and non-threatening to the center.
Evidence from Russia, China, and Egypt provides some preliminary support of sub-
national authoritarian incumbents’ incentives to keep politics local. In the realm of
contentious politics, Chen (2012) argues that local protest and petitioning is actually
an integral part of the Chinese authoritarian state, with local leaders expected to han-
dle protest at the lowest possible level and limit disruptive “skip-level” and cross-locality
tactics. Blaydes (2010) demonstrates that appointed local officials in Egypt were more
likely to be dismissed if they failed to deliver high electoral margins for regime party
candidates. While neither of these cases concern elected officials, they do demonstrate
that subnational containment of challenges is both effective and desirable for the central
government, with local leaders losing the support of the center when they fail to localize
contestation effectively. In Russia, as previously mentioned, Reuter et al. (2016) demon-
strated that the centralizing Putin government maintained direct mayoral elections only
when they served the center, implying that mayors whose position seems tenuous or who
fail to deliver votes run the risk of being deposed from above in favor of more reliable
subnational appointee-autocrats. This is consistent with the previous evidence, while also
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demonstrating that both local appointments and elections demonstrate similar localiza-
tion phenomena.
Qualitative evidence from Russia likewise provides evidence that opposition actors
were successful when they focused on local issues. In Yekatarinburg, opposition candi-
date Yevgeny Roizman won the mayor’s seat on the basis of his reputation as the head
of a local NGO fighting drug addiction, defeating a well-known regional regime party
politician. His platform focused on distinctly local issues, such as promises to repair
playgrounds, avoid conflict with the regional authorities, and prevent disruptive infill
building in the city (Kovalenko 2013). While Roizman remained in office for his entire
term, regional authorities have since succeeded in outmaneuvering him and eliminating
direct mayoral elections (Meduza 2018) Opposition mayor Yevgeny Urlashov was elected
in a landslide in Yaroslavl in 2012, on a campaign against corruption and incompetence
in the city, particularly when it came to the poor construction of roads (Englund 2013).
Additionally, he capitalized on a local tragedy: the death of the entire local hockey team
(Yaroslavl Lokomotiv) in a plane crash. Also in line with the theory, Urlashov was quickly
charged with and convicted of extortion in 2013, shortly after attempting to break lo-
cal containment by striking an agreement with prominent national oppositionist Mikhail
Prokhorov to top his party list in regional parliamentary elections (Herszenhorn 2013).
In both cases, the opposition mayors’ focus on local issues seems likely to have given
them the traction necessary to win mayoral campaigns and establish some sort of politi-
cal foothold, though neither mayor was ultimately able to successfully resist regional or
national authoritarians.
The Moscow Renovation Project
My analysis will contribute to the literature by investigating urban opposition sup-
port in a paradigmatic electoral authoritarian regime, Russia. A large, disruptive housing
project in Moscow preceded substantial opposition gains on municipal formation 1 coun-
1 The Russian equivalent of a city district or borough.
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cils in September 2017. As a large capital city, control of Moscow is crucial for the regime’s
ability to confront collective action and electoral threats, and also a rational target for
opposition actors looking to build an organizational base to contest higher-level elections.
This represents an ideal test case for the importance of a local issue due to the specifically
local nature of the most salient campaign issue, the renovation project, and the strong
incentive for both opposition and regime actors to avoid nationalizing contestation.
The Moscow renovation project is intended to replace decaying Soviet housing stock
throughout the city, in particular the five-story walk-up apartment buildings colloquially
known as “Khrushchyovki”. These buildings were constructed in the aftermath of World
War Two to resolve a severe housing shortage, and were never intended to stand as long
as they have; as such, they are in varying degrees of disrepair. The Moscow administra-
tion selected 4,573 buildings for potential inclusion in the project. Residents were then
allowed to vote on whether or not the buildings were to be demolished; if two-thirds of
the apartments in a building supported demolition, it was included in the project. The
administration promised residents of included buildings that they would be resettled in
equivalent housing in a newly-constructed building if they voted for inclusion. Nearly all
buildings voted for inclusion. However, despite the apparent popularity of the project
with residents of included buildings, the project has inspired protests throughout Moscow,
with Muscovites expressing concerns about the impact of such a large construction project
on their neighborhoods, the potentially low quality of new buildings, and potential issues
with transport associated with the project. (Levada Center 2017).
While the residential renovation project is tied in a minor way to President Putin, who
has publicly supported the project’s implementation, it is part of a broader beautifica-
tion campaign intimately tied to incumbent Moscow Mayor Sobyanin (Smyth 2018). The
mayor’s office is directly in charge of the implementation of the project, having drafted
the law that set it into motion and determined its course (Golunov 2017c). In addition,
the project seems tailor-made to shore up Sobyanin’s political machine, with the lucra-
tive building and demolition contracts associated with the project going to political allies
and powerful local elites Golunov (2017b). Some evidence also exists that the project
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was intended to reward regime supporters, and a massive PR campaign for the project
launched by the mayor’s office was targeted towards shoring up the support of ordinary
Muscovites for Sobyanin (Smyth 2018; Golunov 2017a) Sobyanin is thus disincentivized
from turning to the center to crush local opposition. Requesting resources or support
from the national government would make Sobyanin appear unable to handle the routine
electoral authoritarian tasks of out-maneuvering opposition and distributing rents, jeop-
ardizing his position at the head of the Moscow political machine.
Similar incentives hold for the opposition. The project has already inspired consid-
erable local protest, mobilizing many people for the first time and potentially creating a
new, motivated constituency for outside political forces if they effectively take issue own-
ership (Levada Center 2017). However, given the unprecedentedly high approval of the
Russian president and the presidential administration’s substantial ability to marginalize
and dismantle national opposition challengers, the opposition is strongly disincentivized
to avoid challenging actors or policies above the municipal level.
Finally, the very nature of the project makes it an ideal issue for opposition actors to
capitalize on at the local level. While abstract ideas of property rights and corruption
are certainly likely to be considerations in Muscovites opinion of the project, at its core
it concerns the building next door or even a resident’s own home. In densely-populated
Moscow, construction of this scale promises to be a major disruption that will affect the
lives of many, particularly those in regions with higher numbers of affected buildings.
A qualitative examination of the municipal council electoral campaign appears to con-
firm the usefulness of this case for testing localization theory. The federal government was
largely absent from the council campaigns, likely due to their perceived non-importance
to the center. However, the campaign was critical for the Sobyanin regime; Moscow
utilizes a so-called “municipal filter” to determine candidacy for the mayoral race. May-
oral candidates must receive a nomination from one municipal council member on 110
different municipal councils in order to be included on the ballot. With the 2017 mu-
nicipal elections shortly preceding the March 2018 presidential elections and September
2018 mayoral elections, these seemingly unimportant sub-municipal elections represented
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a critical test of Sobyanin’s electoral machine.
Likewise, for the opposition this represented a critical chance to seize an issue and
disrupt the Moscow political machine without having to face the central government,
potentially gaining a political and ideological foothold to challenge higher-level elections,
such as the mayoral race. Unfortunately for them, the Sobyanin machine was largely suc-
cessful. While the opposition’s seat gains were impressive relative to past results, United
Russia was largely successful, winning 75% of available seats and denying the opposition
a chance to overcome the municipal filter. Regardless of the final result, it is clear that
the opposition performed better than expected in the context of an important and po-
larizing local issue and in the capital city of a strong, highly-centralized authoritarian
regime. If a local issue was able to help the opposition gain a foothold here, the effect
of local issues may be even stronger in less politically important cities in Russia or less
centralized authoritarian regimes.
In light of the theory and the case selection, I have the following hypothesis:
As the number of affected buildings within a voters’ neighborhood rises, the probability
that they will vote for the opposition increases.
A potential alternative explanation is that opposition gains are due to relative turnout
rather than local issues, i.e. the opposition simply turned out its voters more effectively
than the regime in this particular election. However, comparatively high opposition
turnout is still consistent with the potential importance of local issues. In the context
of generally low-turnout local elections where opposition voters face potential repression
in addition to the standard cost of voting, there is little theoretical distinction between
driving increased turnout and driving opposition vote choice. Even if oppositions estab-
lish local footholds by exploiting low turnout elections, it is critical to know how they
mobilize their voters more effectively than the regime. After all, despite low turnout, the
opposition rarely wins local elections. Furthermore, my alternative model specification
with the interaction between the mayoral vote and the housing project directly tests for
this effect; if the story is that the renovation project is driving higher mobilization of
voters who already support the opposition rather than building local support, this model
11
will provide more predictive power than the model using only the renovation project as
an independent variable.
Data and Empirical Strategy
In this section, I will begin with a brief discussion of the data I will use to test
my hypothesis. I will then argue that the main independent variable is not exogenous,
necessitating the use of an instrumental variable. Following this, I will specify and explain
the use of a multilevel beta regression with a control function. Finally, I will interpret
my hypothesis in light of the modeling strategy.
Data
While individual-level data would be ideal for this project, such data is not currently
available. As such, I have brought data down to the lowest level available: the polling
station. Moscow has 3,619 voting districts, many of which serve geographically small
and densely populated areas, meaning most municipal formations have several polling
stations. Both the dependent variable and treatment variable are calculated at this level.
Controls are also at the lowest level available in Russian census data, the municipal for-
mation. While the ecological fallacy is still a risk in this analysis, I have minimized it to
the greatest degree possible given data limitations.
The primary independent variable is the average resident’s experience of the Moscow
renovation project. Since I lack individual-level data, I operationalized this as the number
of included buildings within the average commute distance from the local polling station.
Using the polling station as a central point and a proxy for voters’ place of residence, I
calculated the polling station’s distance from the three closest metro stations, to represent
the varying commutes Muscovites may take through their neighborhood. This distance
was averaged, and used as a radius for a spacial buffer, within which the number of af-
fected buildings were counted. Metro stations were chosen because Moscow’s metro is by
far the modal form of transit for Muscovites. Where I was unable to identify the nearest
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metro, the overall average distance was used 2 . Polling station areas are generally quite
small and densely populated, so while this measurement is not ideal, without individually
geolocating voters’ addresses or a survey random sample clustered by polling station, bet-
ter measures are not forthcoming. This measure is also more likely to be accurate than
a simple count within polling station boundaries, as this would create the unrealistic as-
sumption that residents of a voting district do not cross district boundaries during their
daily commute through their neighborhood. It is also possible that Muscovites are likely
to be affected by renovation at the other end of their commute (work, school, etc.), but
again, the lack of individual data limits my ability to test this. Figure 1 displays munic-
ipal formation boundaries and buildings included in the renovation project 3 . I also run
models using an interaction between the number of buildings and municipal formation
level vote in Moscow’s 2013 mayoral election to test for differential effects between more
and less opposition friendly districts. Russian online news organization Meduza kindly
provided me with a geocoded dataset of included buildings.
The dependent variable of interest is the share of the polling station level vote won
by the opposition. There are 2,975 polling stations in total, representing elections to
125 municipal councils 4 . I have operationalized a maximal and minimal definition of
the opposition. The maximal definition includes all parties except the Communist Party
of the Russian Federation and United Russia, the regime party. I did not include the
Communist Party despite their role as a nominal opposition party, as they are widely
considered co-opted (Reuter and Robertson 2014). The minimal definition focuses on the
out-of-system opposition; this definition only includes parties not currently represented in
the State Duma. Like the Communists, the literature often considers in-system parties to
be para-statal or astro-turfed (March 2009). Having two separate opposition indicators
allows me to control for this possibility and also note potentially interesting differences
2 Approximately 8% of cases
3 created using ggmap (Kahle and Wickham 2013)
4 The remaining municipal formations have elections on off-years
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Fig. 1: Map of Included Buildings
in party choice. The data was scraped from the Moscow central election committee’s
website.
A number of control variables are also used. To control for past local and national
party preference, I included the percentage of the vote won by the maximal opposition
for both the 2013 Moscow mayoral elections and the 2016 State Duma elections. The
Moscow municipal elections also represent a first attempt of the opposition to coordi-
nate at the municipal level, with many independent opposition candidates, the in-system
Yabloko 5 , and the out-of-system PARNAS parties cooperating under the umbrella of
Dmitry Gudkov’s United Democrats coalition (Bennetts 2017). As such, I control for
entry coordination based on the findings of Cox (1997), creating a measure of the number
of opposition candidates above the n+1 threshold identified as optimal in his work. I also
include a number of socioeconomic controls taken from Russian census microdata at the
municipal formation level. I include per capita monthly income, government dependence,
and higher education from this data. Government dependence is the total percentage of
residents who rely on disability, unemployment, pension, or some other form as welfare as
5 Yabloko has only one seat on the Federation Council
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their primary means of income. This excludes students receiving stipends. Higher educa-
tion is the percentage of residents with a bachelor’s degree or higher within the municipal
formation. Table 1 displays summary statistics for the dataset. I also control for the size
of the buffer, to account for the fact that areas with longer than average commutes may
include more buildings as a function of the measurement strategy, and the population of
the municipal formation, as a proxy for population density, which likewise may be related
to the number of buildings within commute distance.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Max Opposition Vote 2,972 0.392 0.146 0.002 0.889
Min Opposition Vote 2,972 0.202 0.107 0.000 0.768
# Commute 2,972 63.545 79.489 0 456
# Eligible Buildings 2,972 246.352 224.088 0 1,363
Duma Opposition (2016) 2,972 0.485 0.045 0.383 0.593
Mayoral Opposition (2013) 2,972 0.380 0.044 0.234 0.491
Avg. Monthly Pay 2,972 71,150.640 19,686.420 45,954.500 148,540.900
Government Dependence 2,972 19.639 2.910 10.632 28.974
Higher Education (%) 2,972 35.030 6.777 15.957 53.103
Max Cox 2,972 36.243 12.049 10 82
Min Cox 2,972 4.933 7.554 −8 39
Dealing with Endogeneity and Model Specification
The Renovation Project and Patronage Politics
While the replacement of old housing stock would appear to be an exogenous variable,
evidence exists that the selection of buildings for the project was not independent of my
dependent variable: opposition support. Smyth (2018) finds that out of all buildings eli-
gible for demolition, buildings that were located in districts with higher levels of support
for Vladimir Putin in the 2012 presidential elections were more likely to be included in
the demolition project. This result is robust to controls for the value, age, and location
of the building. As is typical of authoritarian regimes and has been argued earlier, this
evidence indicates that the project was targeted at supporters of the regime.
As such, including the number of affected buildings in the analysis as-is would violate
the conditional independence assumption of causal inference, necessitating the use of an
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instrument. Following Smyth (2018) I use eligibility to be included in the project as an
instrument for inclusion. Using a dataset scraped from Reforma GKH on all Russian
housing stock, I define all five-story buildings built between 1930 and 1979 as eligible
for inclusion. While the housing project does include some newer and taller buildings,
the overwhelming majority of included buildings fall into this age range and height qual-
ification, indicating that the instrument has only a small degree of measurement error.
Eligibility is also exogenous; the buildings included were almost exclusively built during
the post-WWII Soviet housing shortage, and the buildings are spread across densely-
populated Moscow, buying independence from many demographic factors (Smyth 2018).
While it is still possible that residents of these buildings vary in some consistent way,
such as being lower-income, the inclusion of demographic controls in the model gives
conditional independence at the municipal formation level, the best level of independence
possible given data limitations.
Model Specification
The bounded nature of the outcome variables prevents the use of standard two
stage least squares (2SLS) instrumental variables (IV) estimation, forcing me to turn
to a control function multilevel beta regression. Beta regression provides unbiased,
heteroskedasticity-robust estimates of model parameters and standard errors for outcome
variables on the unit scale, even when the outcome distribution is highly skewed (Ferrari
and Cribari-Neto 2004; Cribari-Neto and Zeileis 2010). This makes beta regression par-
ticularly well-suited to modeling vote data. Like other generalized linear models, beta
regression utilizes a link function; while many choices are available, I have chosen the
commonly used logit link to allow easy interpretation of coefficients in terms of log odds
and predicted probabilities.
However, standard 2SLS is inappropriate with a non-linear second stage, as the linear
projection of the instrument onto the endogenous variable does not carry through the
link function. I choose instead to utilize control function IV estimation, which uses the
residuals from a linear first stage as a predictor in the second stage. The first stage is a
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regression of the endogenous predictor (number of affected buildings within the commute
buffer) on the instrument and all other covariates, producing residuals that are exogenous
to the number of buildings by model design. Assuming the standard OLS assumptions
hold, the residuals are also an estimate of the portion of the endogenous variable not
explained by the conditionally exogenous instrument (number of buildings eligible for
inclusion within the buffer). Including these residuals in the second stage then controls
for the endogenous portion of the number of buildings, therefore estimating a treatment
effect which under the standard IV assumptions is consistent (Wooldridge 2015; Blundell
and Powell 2003). I also include random intercepts at the municipal formation level to
control for unobserved heterogeneity between municipal formations.
The full model is specified as:
First Stage:
x ∼ N (β0 + δZ + ξC, σx)
Second Stage:
yi ∼ B(µi, φ)
µi = logit
−1(αm[i] + β1x+ β2νˆ + β3C)
αm ∼ N (ηCm, σm)
Where x is the number of included buildings, Z is the number of eligible buildings (the
instrument), C is a matrix containing the control variables,B is the standard beta dis-
tribution, µi is the polling station level opposition support, φ is a nuisance parameter
that controls the intensity of the distribution, νˆ are the first stage residuals (the control
function), and Cm are control variables at the municipal formation level.
The model with the interaction term contains a second first stage equation, specified as:
xx2 ∼ N (β0 + δZx2 + δ2Z + ξC, σxx)
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Max Instrument Min Instrument
Eligible Buildings 0.93∗ 0.93∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Adj. R2 0.80 0.80
Num. obs. 2972 2972
F statistic 1312.82 1314.69
∗p < 0.05
Table 2: Instrument Strength
Where x2 is mayoral opposition, and the instrument used for the interaction variable
is the interaction between the number of eligible buildings and mayoral opposition, per
Wooldridge (2010).
While the control function approach produces a consistent estimate of the primary
effect of interest, β1, it does not produce asymptotically correct standard errors due to
the two-stage regression process. As such, I use a non-parametric bootstrap to estimate
95% confidence intervals for all parameters. In the simplest possible terms, this model
can be interpreted as an ordinary GLM with logit coefficients and bootstrap confidence
intervals rather than standard t-tests.
Table 2 reports the first stage regression results, demonstrating that the instrument
is strong.
In light of the modeling strategy: I reinterpret my hypothesis as:
As the number of affected buildings within average commute distance of a polling station
rises, the opposition vote at that polling station will also rise.
I will reject the null hypothesis of the housing project having no effect if β1 is both
substantively large and statistically significant at the standard 0.05 confidence level; i.e.
the 95% confidence interval will not include zero. Failure to reject this hypothesis will
provide evidence that a local issue helped the Moscow-based opposition gain a political
foothold in municipal council elections.
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Results and Discussion
I will begin this section with a presentation of model results. I will then discuss why
we may be seeing non-results at this point in time, centering mainly on the impact of the
renovation project at the time of writing. I will then move on to discuss how interesting
results in the controls do suggest some role for local politics in voting patterns under
authoritarianism. While not the primary purpose of this analysis, I will discuss these
results, which I find to be robust using a more efficient estimation strategy. I will close
with a discussion of avenues for further research.
Results
Table 3 displays estimates for the first set of models, in which the number of affected
buildings within the average commute distance is the treatment. Confidence intervals are
displayed under coefficient estimates, with the star indicating that the 95% confidence
interval does not include zero. Confidence intervals are taken from 10,000 non-parametric
bootstrap estimates and are biased corrected and accelerated. Table 4 presents the results
of the second model, in which the primary DV of interest is an interaction between the
number of buildings within commute distance and mayoral opposition vote. To aid model
convergence and interpretation, all independent variables have been normalized to have
a mean of zero and standard deviation of 1.
Discussion
The results provide no direct evidence towards the hypothesis. The number of affected
buildings provides no statistically significant effect on the maximal opposition vote, and
has a small statistically significant effect in the opposite-from-hypothesized direction on
the minimal opposition vote. In the interaction model, the interaction term does have a
statistically significant positive effect on the maximal opposition vote, but this effect is
near zero. Thus, we cannot find evidence to support the hypothesis that being near more
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Max. Opposition Min. Opposition
Intercept −0.46∗ −1.44∗
[−0.47; −0.45] [−1.46; −1.42]
Control Function −0.08∗ 0.09∗
[−0.13; −0.02] [0.04; 0.16]
# Commute 0.00 −0.09∗
[−0.03; 0.04] [−0.13; −0.05]
Mayoral Opposition (2013) 0.26∗ 0.10∗
[0.24; 0.30] [0.06; 0.15]
Duma Opposition (2016) 0.06∗ −0.03∗
[0.03; 0.08] [−0.06; −0.00]
Higher Education 0.05∗ −0.06∗
[0.02; 0.07] [−0.10; −0.03]
Pay −0.00 −0.06∗
[−0.02; 0.01] [−0.07; −0.04]
Government Dependence −0.04∗ −0.01
[−0.06; −0.03] [−0.03; 0.01]
Cox Ratio 0.12∗ 0.40∗
[0.10; 0.14] [0.38; 0.42]
Buffer Area −0.02∗ −0.00
[−0.04; −0.00] [−0.02; 0.02]
Population Total −0.06∗ −0.05∗
[−0.08; −0.04] [−0.07; −0.03]
BIC -5437.10 -7157.82
Deviance explained 0.69 0.63
Num. obs. 2972 2972
∗ 0 outside the confidence interval
Table 3: # Commute
20
Max. Opposition Min. Opposition
Intercept −0.44∗ −1.43∗
[−0.46; −0.43] [−1.44; −1.41]
Control Function (Interaction) −0.11∗ −0.00
[−0.17; −0.05] [−0.07; 0.07]
Control Function (# Commute) −0.07∗ 0.09∗
[−0.12; −0.01] [0.03; 0.15]
# Commute * Mayoral Opp. 0.07∗ 0.05
[0.03; 0.11] [−0.00; 0.10]
# Commute 0.01 −0.08∗
[−0.03; 0.04] [−0.13; −0.04]
Mayoral Opposition (2013) 0.27∗ 0.10
[0.24; 0.30] [−0.04; 0.02]
Duma Opposition (2016) 0.08∗ −0.02∗
[0.05; 0.10] [0.06; 0.15]
Higher Education 0.05∗ −0.06
[0.03; 0.08] [−0.03; 0.01]
Pay 0.00 −0.05∗
[−0.01; 0.02] [−0.09; −0.03]
Government Dependence −0.05∗ −0.01∗
[−0.06; −0.03] [−0.07; −0.03]
Cox Ratio 0.12∗ 0.41∗
[0.10; 0.14] [0.38; 0.43]
Buffer Area −0.01 0.00
[−0.03; 0.01] [−0.02; 0.03]
Population −0.06∗ −0.05∗
[−0.08; −0.04] [−0.07; −0.03]
BIC -5445.43 -7153.19
Deviance explained 0.69 0.63
Num. obs. 2972 2972
∗ 0 outside the confidence interval
Table 4: Interaction
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included buildings increased the vote for the opposition.
While I cannot conclusively determine why I failed to support my hypothesis, it is
possible that the operationalization of the treatment variable placed too high of an infor-
mational demand on voters. At the time of the municipal council elections, the renovation
project consisted solely of a list; buildings had not yet started to come down. My opera-
tionalization of average commute distance required voters to know at least roughly how
many buildings they passed on a day-to-day basis that were included on that list. With-
out individual-level data, we will never know whether individuals who were aware of the
project’s impact on their neighborhood did vote in the hypothesized way. However, the
upcoming mayoral elections may present a chance to remedy this deficiency. Buildings
are scheduled to begin coming down this year, reducing the informational costs for voters
in evaluating the program’s impact by creating real inconveniences associated with demo-
lition rather than requiring them to know which buildings are affected and forecast how
much the project will impact their lives. While I have not demonstrated the importance
of a local issue in this particular authoritarian election, it is possible I will be able to do
so in the future.
In addition, there remains the possibility that the clientelistic aspect of the renova-
tion project has created heterogeneous treatment effects which I am unable to control
for. Buildings were selected based in part on prior regime support, and the promise of
new housing may have made residents of included buildings more likely to vote for the
regime while making their neighbors less likely to vote to regime, causing the effects to
cancel each other out. At this time, I have not been able to locate data on residency of
affected buildings, a crucial control that would allow me to determine whether heteroge-
neous treatment effects exist and condition on them.
However, results in the controls provide evidence of the importance of investigating
local political patterns in explaining how opposition actors gain political footholds. In-
terestingly, in both maximal opposition models, mayoral vote is a far stronger predictor
of municipal council vote than Duma vote, despite the Duma election having only oc-
curred in the previous year while the mayoral election occurred four years earlier. These
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Max Opposition Min Opposition
Intercept −3.8416∗ −1.7629∗
(0.0868) (0.0979)
Duma Opposition 1.4271∗ −0.5719∗
(0.2330) (0.2555)
Mayoral Opposition 6.0018∗ 1.8134∗
(0.2814) (0.3148)
Avg. Monthly Pay 0.0000∗ −0.0000∗
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Government Dependence −0.0123∗ −0.0029
(0.0024) (0.0027)
Higher Education 0.0079∗ −0.0048∗
(0.0015) (0.0016)
Cox Ratio Max 0.0084∗
(0.0007)
Cox Ratio Min 0.0537∗
(0.0011)
Num. obs. 2975 2975
Num. groups 125 125
Nagelkerke R2 0.6759 0.6094
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 5: Predicting Municipal council vote
results suggest that there is a disconnect between national level voting patterns and local
level voting patterns in Moscow, raising several interesting questions. To determine to
what extent the results are an artifact of the instrumental variables estimation strategy, I
ran simple multilevel beta regressions without the use of the housing project and control
function variables. In both these models, the mayoral opposition variable emerges as a
much stronger predictor of municipal council opposition vote. Table 5 shows the results
of these regressions 6 , and Figure 2 shows predicted opposition votes along the range
of values of both mayoral opposition and Duma opposition using the observed values
approach for both models (Hanmer and Ozan Kalkan 2013). As can be seen, mayoral
opposition provides considerably more information about a polling station’s municipal
council vote despite being a less temporally proximate predictor.
Little can be said about the reason for this disconnect due to potential confounders,
6 Variables are not normalized in this model
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though its existence does suggest the importance of local politics for understanding au-
thoritarian regimes. If local authoritarian elections matter little for both national and
opposition actors, as Gandhi and Lust-Okar (2009) argue, we should expect to see a clear
connection between national-level opposition vote and local-level opposition vote. This
would suggest that local elections in authoritarian regimes are second-order elections in
which people vote based on the party/parties they identify with nationally. This is not
the result that is seen in the original analysis or the simpler analysis above. Rather, it
suggests that either local elections turn out different kinds of voters in different propor-
tions or that voters behave differently at the local and national level. A comparative
analysis of turnout, beyond the scope of the current analysis, could help determine the
extent to which these two implications are true. If the opposition does better in lower
turnout authoritarian elections, it suggests they have effective mobilizational connections
to voters on the local level that regime machine turnout efforts swamp at the national
level. If turnout is not a factor, it implies that voters may make different choices at the
local and national level.
Either of the above theories suggests that the black boxing of urban politics in the
literature has obscured important evidence on how oppositions position themselves to
challenge national regimes. If actors have established effective local level ties, this calls
into question whether oppositions are best served by running ambitious national cam-
paigns, as Bunce and Wolchik (2011) argue, or attempting to capitalize on the local
connection, per Lucardi (2016). If voters make different choices at the national and local
levels, this paints a different picture of the authoritarian voter that the extant one in the
literature: rather than exclusively disengaged or coerced, voters may behave differently
depending on the relative stakes and risks of the election in question, potentially turning
lower-stakes local elections into relatively more competitive contests.
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Conclusion
While I have not proven here that local issues are an important factor in authoritar-
ian electoral success, some evidence has been provided that local political patterns are
distinct from national political patterns, contrary to the dominant assumptions in the
literature. This suggests that local politics remain an under-theorized and potentially
important dimension of authoritarian politics .
In particular, the evidence in this article suggests that either local elections or local
voters are different from their national-level counterparts, with intriguing implications
for authoritarian durability. It is well-established that national regime change is often
preceded by ruling party losses in local elections, and the evidence presented here implies
that local political patterns rather than national political patterns (such as incumbent
weakness) could be critical in explaining how opposition actors gain footholds that can
be used to compete at the national level. Further research into why local and national
political patterns differ, holding open the possibility that local issues may be important,
will add considerable nuance to our study of authoritarian elections and authoritarian
survival more broadly.
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